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ABSTRACT
Automated Reverse Engineering of Malware to Develop Network Signatures to Match
With Known Network Signatures
by
Dan Sinema, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2014
Major Professor: Dr. Dan Watson
Department: Computer Science
The detection of network-based malware is often reactionary; discovery generally hap-
pens after the malware has begun attacking the target system. Detecting the attack after
the fact affects the performance of the victim device and potentially the entire computer
network of the victim device. Intrusion detection systems are deployed to monitor network
traffic for malware attacks, but unfortunately these systems cannot preemptively detect ma-
licious behavior on a network. Automated reverse engineering is able to detect potentially
malicious network behavior of a binary offline prior to a network-based attack. Collecting
information found inside a binary, such as strings and function calls, compiling this informa-
tion into generated signatures, and then comparing to known network signatures allows for
malicious behavior of a binary to be discovered and quarantined before attacking a device
and network.
(72 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Automated Reverse Engineering of Malware to Develop Network Signatures to Match
With Known Network Signatures
Dan Sinema
Illicit software that seeks to steal user information, deny service, or cause general
mayhem on computer networks is often discovered after the damage has been done. The
ability to discover network behavior of software before a computer network is utilized would
allow administrators to protect and preserve valuable resources. Static reverse engineering
is the process of discovering in a offline environment how a software application is built
and how it will behave. By automating static reverse engineering, software behavior can
be discovered before it is executed on client devices. Fingerprints are then built from
the discovered behavior which is matched with known malicious fingerprints to identify
potentially dangerous software.
vACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Chad Mano for teaching class in my first semester in the
program that peaked my interest in computer security. I would also like to thank my many
committee members for their patience in waiting for me to finish this thesis. And especially
Dr. Dan Watson for helping me close this thesis out and pushing me to finish.
I am especially thankful for my family for the encouragement, support, and patience
that they showed me over the many late nights and weekends I spent working on this thesis.
Dan Sinema
vi
CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
PUBLIC ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 BINARY OBFUSCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3 REVERSE ENGINEERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Static Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Reverse Engineering Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4 INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BINARY EXECUTABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Static Strings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 System Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Other Static Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5 NETWORK SIGNATURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1 Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 Snort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3 Anatomy of a Snort Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 BUILDING SIGNATURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1 Developing Network Signatures with Static Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.4 Building General Signatures Based on the String Data as a Catch-all . . . . 28
6.5 Matching Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7 FUTURE WORK AND DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
vii
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix A SinemaThesis.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B NetworkFunction.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Appendix C Backtrace.py . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Appendix D Boyer-Moore-Horspool Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix E Excluded Strings List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendix F Snort Rules Used for the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
F.1 Snort Community rules: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
F.2 Bleeding Snort rules: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F.3 Emerging Threats Snort rules: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F.4 Vorant IRC Bot Snort rules: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
viii
ACRONYMS
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
C & C Command & Control
CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing
DNS Domain Name System
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
FLIRT Fast Library Identification and Recognition Technology
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HIDS Host-based Intrusion Detection System
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IP Internet Protocol
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange
IRC Internet Relay Chat
NIDS Network-based Intrusion Detection System
OSI Open Systems Interconnections
PE Portable Executable
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UPX Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Modern day malware is not isolated to pre-defined exploits like malware of the past [1].
Much of today’s malware connects over computer networks to centralized servers known
as a command and control servers (C & C servers). These servers send commands to the
malware instructing it to execute network or computer based exploits, massive coordinated
network attacks, or email spam [2]. When this type of malware infects a computer, the
computer becomes known as a zombie, and a collection of zombies is known as a botnet.
The communication channel between the zombie and the C & C server is typically standard
protocols such as internet relay chat (IRC) or hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). The
botnet is controlled by a botmaster that issues singular commands to run in coordination
on the botnet. The command might be a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS), this
attack sends millions, upon millions of network packets from the zombies to a targeted
device; this deluge of network traffic overwhelms the targeted network device and leads to
it becoming unresponsive or possibly crashing.
Criminals and criminal organizations have used the threat of DDoS attack by botnets to
extract payments from corporations and organizations [3], recently botnets have been used
for political activism, attacking corporate competition, and even nations “weaponizing”
botnets to attack a rival nation’s infrastructure [4–6]. In a recent case, it is suspected a
company in the mining industry and a company in the wine-making industry used DDoS
to attack competitor’s websites [7]. In addition botnets are now being rented openly on the
Internet for relatively insignificant amounts of money [8]. Because of the seriousness of the
threat the research of detecting and neutralizing botnets is very relevant and important,
and reducing the number of bots will reduce the effectiveness of a botnet.
This thesis will show that an automated approach to reverse engineering of binaries
2through static analysis is an effective method to build signatures of a binary’s network
behavior. Embedded in a binary is information that infers how and what it will send on
a network; although not as detailed as raw source code, enough information is disclosed
to identify network behavior. This information includes system calls, embedded strings,
and data flow paths. By using reverse engineering techniques the data needed for network
signatures can be identified, traced and extracted without the need to execute a binary
and capture live network data. The data when derived and combined together provides
enough information to build identifying signatures of a static binary’s network behavior.
The ability to discover network behavior before the malware is active on a live network can
prevent propagation of malware on other computers, denial of service or other exploits, and
generally can protect sensitive information. The automation of deriving network signatures
from a static binary is the primary contribution of this thesis.
The early chapters (2-4) give background on reverse engineering and the signature
format for this thesis. The remaining chapters discuss the reverse engineering process, the
data being sought after, and how the data is used to build signatures. Chapter 2 discusses
binary obfuscation as related to reverse engineering. Chapter 3 provides an overview of
the different reverse engineering methods used today and the tools used to automate the
reverse engineering process for this paper. Chapter 4 examines the various network system
calls and data contained in a binary that are used to build signatures. Chapter 5 looks
at the open source Snort Intrusion Detection System, and Snort rules which will be the
format of signatures produced by the implementation of this thesis. Chapter 6 will describe
the design and implementation of the network signatures, how the data is gathered and
compiled based upon the information described in previous chapters, and finally the process
of matching the generated network signatures and the known network signatures. Chapter
6 also includes the results the experiment based on this paper. Chapter 7 presents future
work and directions for this topic of research.
1.1 Related Works
There is considerable previous work on the subject of automated signature generation.
3Kaur and Singh [9] provide an overview of the current automated signature generation sys-
tems, the authors divide the systems into two categories signature generation with attack
detection and signature generation without attack detection. The first category is systems
such as Honeycyber [10], ARBOR [11], Argos [12], and Hamsa [13] which mainly use dy-
namic analysis like honetnets and packet tracing for signature generation. The projects that
fall in the category of signature generation without attack detection are Hancock [14], F-
Sign [15], and Auto-Sign [16]. Hancock utilizes static disassembly to generate string based
signatures, the signatures are in a format for antivirus software. F-Sign generates byte-
string signatures based upon unique functions contained in the binary, the signatures are in
the eDare format. Auto-Sign generates signatures similar to F-Sign but in addition the final
signature is based on entropy. All of these systems simply create signatures to be used with
external IDSs in this paper not only are signatures auto-generated but those signatures are
then compared to known signatures to find matches or highly related signatures. While the
other systems rely on IDSs collecting data from a network connection, this paper performs
the matching of signatures offline.
4CHAPTER 2
BINARY OBFUSCATION
Binary obfuscation is a common technique used by malware developers to frustrate
reverse engineers and attempt to prevent detection by anti-malware software. Packers and
obfuscators are software applications used to obfuscate malware binaries. In many cases
packers and obfuscators are legitimate software products used by legitimate developers to
reduce binary file size or protect their code from competitors or software crackers. For
example, a developer might use a packer to reduce the size of their application binary for
Internet downloading or to frustrate a reverse engineer the developer may use a packer to
encrypt parts of an application binary [17]. Obfuscators are primarily used for languages
such as Java and .Net, as these languages compile binaries into intermediate byte code to
run in virtual machines, and this intermediate byte code can be reversed to Java or .Net
source code without much effort. To protect intellectual property from software pirates and
competitors, developers often employ obfuscators to “scramble” the byte code making it
difficult to reverse the byte code into source code [17].
There are a number of different tools and techniques that can be used to detect if a
binary has been packed or obfuscated. A technique used to discover if a PE file (a Windows
binary) has been “packed” is to examine the PE file header and look for non-standard PE
sections. The UPX packer [18] is an example, that creates non-standard sections UPX0
and UPX1 that are generally not found in a non-packed binary. Figure 2.1 is the Microsoft
DUMPBIN utility output of a UPX packed binary and Figure 2.2 is the DUMPBIN output
of a non-UPX packed binary for comparison. Another method is to simply try to unpack
binaries with the various packing utilities to see if the file will unpack. And finally utilities
such as PEfile [19] examine a PE file and compare against known packer signatures to
determine if the file is packed and will try to determine which packer packed the file. Seitz
5demonstrates how to use PyEmu [20] a Python library to extract the UPX0 and UPX1
sections of a UPX packed PE file without the use of the UPX packer [21].
C:\upx391w>dumpbin calc_upx.exe
Microsoft (R) COFF/PE Dumper Version 10.00.30319.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Dump of file calc_upx.exe
File Type: EXECUTABLE IMAGE
Summary
17000 .rsrc
88000 UPX0
3D000 UPX1
Figure 2.1: DUMPBIN Results of a Calc.exe packed by the UPX packer.
The investigation of binary obfuscation is a lengthy subject in itself and the tools for
packing and obfuscation are numerous and readily available. This paper will assume the
samples of malware have been stripped of packing or obfuscation prior to examination.
Although in a real world implementation the examination of binaries should be combined
with a de-obfuscation process.
C:\Windows\System32>dumpbin calc.exe
Microsoft (R) COFF/PE Dumper Version 10.00.30319.01
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Dump of file calc.exe
File Type: EXECUTABLE IMAGE
Summary
5000 .data
4000 .reloc
63000 .rsrc
53000 .text
Figure 2.2: DUMPBIN Results of the Calc.exe binary.
6CHAPTER 3
REVERSE ENGINEERING
Two techniques are used today to reverse engineer binaries: static analysis or dynamic
analysis. In general, there are advantages and disadvantages to each; one is not necessarily
better than the other. Static analysis will be utilized for this paper and the experiment.
3.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis is the process of disassembling or decompiling a binary executable,
using a disassembler or decompiler, to generate human readable code [17]. Static analysis
allows a reverse engineer to have a more complete view of an executable [22] including code
branches and logic. In some cases static analysis can be completed quickly, because the
reverse engineer does not need to wait for the program to finish executing or to execute
the program over many different iterations with different variables to examine different
execution paths. Related, if the binary executable is viewed statically the reverse engineer
can safely reverse engineer without the need to quarantine the operating system to prevent
the malware from propagating to other computers or contacting C & C servers. But,
there are disadvantages to static analysis that should be considered. First and foremost
in order to effectively statically analyze a binary executable the reverse engineer should be
well-versed in low-level programming languages such as assembly and C. The source code
examined for static analysis is usually produced by disassemblers that generate assembly
source code or a decompiler that produces C or C-like source code. Decompilers tend
to not be as accurate in source code generation as disassemblers for assembly language
generation due to programming tricks or compiler optimizations, but even disassemblers
can be misled relatively easily. Malware authors are familiar with these limitations and
will add bits of code known as “junk bytes” random pieces of code used to obfuscate and
7“opaque predicates” false branches that always resolve true or false regardless of input.
These confuse disassemblers [17] and result in assembly or source code that is deceptive or
incorrect. Other drawbacks of static analysis are self-modifying code or polymorphic code,
which is commonly found in malware; this code modifies the binary as it executes to change
behavior based on the executing environment. Theoretically, static reverse engineering
would be able to see this in the disassembly yet in practice this turns out to be difficult
because of the many code branches that would be present in the disassembled source code.
3.2 Dynamic Analysis
With dynamic analysis the reverse engineer examines the code executing on a system or
emulated system. The reverse engineer views the actual executed instructions, as opposed
to static analysis where the reverse engineer has to make an educated guess on which
instructions will be executed. The primary drawbacks of dynamic analysis is that malware
authors are aware of the fact that analysts execute the malware in quarantined environments
or under a debugger and place specific code in the malware to detect those situations [23].
The specific code tests the operating environment to see if it is a virtual machine by testing
instruction execution times [24] or using standard Windows calls to detect debuggers [17],
if detection is positive the applications will terminate. And finally setting up quarantined
environment can be cumbersome and time consuming to tweak the environment iterations
to fully test the malware.
3.3 Reverse Engineering Tools
3.3.1 Disassmebler
There are very few disassemblers on the market today, IDA Pro from Hex Rays [25] is
the most popular disassembler today and is the disassembler that is used for this paper’s
experiments. IDA Pro has support for many different processors, file formats, and available
as a executable on Windows, Mac OS X, and the Linux platforms. It also contains a broad
library (known as FLIRT) of signatures of standard library functions on Windows, Mac
8OS X, and Linux. These library signatures allow a reverse engineer to discover or derive
the general behavior of the malware because of the examined executable’s use of standard
library functions.
3.3.2 Python
For this paper’s experiment the Python language is used for automation IDA Pro has
deep Python integration which allows automation of the disassembler. In addition Python
is somewhat of a de facto standard in the reverse engineering community. This is for a
couple reasons: first, the language is relatively easy to learn and the structure of scripts
are extremely readable. Second, Python as a scripting language allows for low-level access
to an operating system which is important for static analysis. Finally because of Python’s
popularity in the community there are a number of resources and code examples for reverse
engineers.
9CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BINARY
EXECUTABLES
The information contained inside a binary can give a reverse engineer clues about
the intended function of the binary and resources it might use. For instance if reverse
engineering can derive, through IDA Pro’s FLIRT signatures [26] that the WinSocket 2
library is linked to the binary; it can then be deduced that the binary most likely will use
a network for data acceptance and/or transmission. With the knowledge the WinSocket
2 library is linked to the binary, imported functions from the WinSocket 2 library, such
as socket() or bind() can be used to gather data about the binary. These imported
functions have data passed as arguments, by examining the arguments and following the
flow of function calls educated assumptions can be made about the network behavior and
the data to be sent on the network by the malware.
dsinema$ strings SDBOT05A.exe
...
GetOEMCP
SetStdHandle
LCMapStringA
LCMapStringW
FlushFileBuffers
bot started.
ctcp
raw PRIVMSG $1 :$chr(1)$2-$chr(1)
ping $1 10000 $2 50
udp $1 10000 2048 50
...
Figure 4.1: Sample output of the strings utility.
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4.1 Static Strings
Binaries contain many static strings or static format strings, see Figure 4.1. The static
format strings are used by functions such as sprintf(), to allow for portions of a static
string to contain dynamic information, see Figure 4.2. Because sprintf() calls typically
precede send() calls, a more accurate signature can be produced if the output string of
sprintf() can be associated with a send() call. If that is not possible the strings can still
be used in a more general manner. IDA Pro is used to extract string information for the
experiment, the usage of the strings utility in Figure 4.2 is for illustration. The specifics
of how static strings are used for this paper are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
%d, %d : USERID : UNIX : %s
Figure 4.2: Example of a format string.
4.2 System Calls
The automation process of this paper looks specifically for system calls that accept or
send data on a computer network. For Windows based systems these functions are contained
in the WinSocket 2 library found on all modern versions of Windows, and is based on the
BSD Sockets library [27]. Examining an Windows binary’s header will disclose the imported
libraries such as WinSocket 2, which is evidence that Socket functions exist in the targeted
binary. Figure 4.3 is a example of a small python script that will list the Windows import
address table (IAT). The output of the script at the end of the figure lists the linked libraries
for SDBOT05A.exe; WS2 32.dll is the WinSocket 2 library. For this paper’s experiment
IDA Pro provides this functionality; the script is for illustration.
The remaining part of this chapter examines some of the function calls that are used to
determine a binary’s network behavior and build signatures. Figure 4.4 from [27] illustrates
the flow of data in the WinSocket 2 library, the experiment of this paper follows the data
flow of the Socket functions.
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#!/usr/bin/env python
# Code can be found at http://tinyurl.com/lgg9zmu
import pefile
pe = pefile.PE(’SDBOT05A.exe’)
for entry in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT:
print entry.dll
Script Output:
dsinema$ ./import-pe.py
KERNEL32.dll
ADVAPI32.dll
SHELL32.dll
WS2_32.dll
WININET.dll
Figure 4.3: Python Script that Extracts Windows PE Import Address Table Including
Execution Results
4.2.1 socket()
The first function in the WinSockets 2 library that could be used for building signatures
is the socket() call. This call returns a descriptor or socket handle, which is used by
other WinSocket 2 functions to send and receive data in that socket. The socket() call
takes as arguments three integers afam, type, and protocol; afam is the address family
such as TCP/IP, IPX, or AppleTalk. The second argument is type, this value signifies
whether the TCP/IP data will be datagrams or a data stream. And finally protocol is an
integer that matches standard protocol numbers defined by IANA and found on Windows
systems in WINDOWS\system32\drivers\etc\protocol. As an example, if the socket()
function arguments are socket(AF INET, SOCK STREAM, 6) this would create a TCP/IP
socket (AF INET) of type TCP (SOCK STREAM) using the protocol of TCP (6).
4.2.2 bind()
The bind() function call is used only if the malware is acting as a server. In many
cases the malware behaves as both a client and a server, the bind() call will help identify
12
which way traffic flows for a socket. The bind() call takes as input a socket handle, a
sock addr structure, and an integer that is the length of the second argument [27]. The
socket handle is of interest because it can disclose what type of address family and protocol
is being used for the bind() call. The sock addr structure contains the IP address and
port number that the server will listen, of these two pieces of data the port number is the
most important. If the port number can be extracted from the bind() call it can be used in
signatures to match incoming connections to the malware. Typically malware does not use
hardcoded IP addresses or DNS host names but uses dynamically generated DNS names
to connect to command and control servers, while the port number will stay consistent.
An effective reactive measure against botnets has been to discover the DNS hostname
generation algorithm and then to take control of those DNS names, often referred to as sink
holing [28]. A discussion of sink holing is outside the scope of this paper, but is mentioned
for completeness.
4.2.3 send()
The send() function is utilized if the malware is a server or client. This function takes
as arguments the socket handle, the data message in the format of a C string, the length
of the data message, and finally some control bits that specify additional behavior. The
first two arguments are of most interest, first the socket handle allows the alignment of the
data with a socket handle in order to determine the destination of the data. The second
argument, the data message, is a pointer to a C string which is used to trace back to a
sprintf() function to extract the string. In many cases the string is the best identifier for
matching malware, because the string is exposed on computer networks.
4.2.4 sprintf()
The sprintf() function is not part of the sockets library, but it often used prior to a
send() call to populate the data message argument for send(). The sprintf() call takes
as arguments a C string that will receive the formatted data, a format string, and finally
the data for the variables in the format string. This function is important for this paper
13
due to the fact it is used to determine the data being passed to the send() function which
is directly associated to a socket handle.
4.3 Other Static Data
The other static data of interest in a binary are integers that are passed to functions
such as socket() or fields in structures such as sock addr. These structures are often
stored in the binary in a hexadecimal format and will be discussed more in Chapter 6.
14
Figure 4.4: Flow of WinSocket 2 function calls. [27]
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CHAPTER 5
NETWORK SIGNATURES
5.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems are hardware or software systems deployed on networks or
on host systems that attempt to detect suspicious behavior on a network or application
by comparing to pre-defined signatures of known malicious network traffic. There are two
types of IDSs, host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) and network-based intrusion
detection systems (NIDS) both systems can be distributed so that data, warnings, and
alerts can be aggregated to centralized management servers. This paper is only concerned
with NIDS and therefore will only discuss NIDS.
5.1.1 Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
NIDS is a service that can run on a host or appliance and monitors the traffic on a
network segment. The network interface of the NIDS host is configured to a promiscuous
mode so that it can view network packets intended for all devices on the same network
segment [29]. The signature style of NIDS is typically human readable strings that signify
network traffic type, ports used, and strings contained in the data payload of network
packet. The signatures are then compared to live traffic by the NIDS parsing the network
packets and utilizing keyword pattern matching algorithms to to match packets with known
signatures [30]. If the packet matches a signature the operator is notified of the match and
can then take appropriate action. This paper we will develop NIDS style signatures from
information found in binaries by reverse engineering using static analysis.
5.2 Snort
Snort will be used as the signature reference platform for this paper. Snort is a popular
16
open source IDS that has an active development community, wide deployment and a large
number of bundled and community provided signatures [31]. The architecture of Snort is a
packet decoder, a detection system and an alert/logging subsystem. Because of the packet
decoder the rules can be simplistic, non-binary and user friendly [32]. This paper is not
concerned with the alert/logging subsystem or the detection system. To build signatures
to be utilized by the alert/logging subsystem or the detection system layers the only need
is to assure that the automated signatures are in the proper format for Snort. The packet
decoder is of interest because knowledge of the data that will be decoded from network
captures assists in determining what type of data is to be found when reverse engineering
a binary. The packet decoder is the first subsystem that will handle a network packet once
acquired by the packet capture system [31]. A network packet is passed through various
decoders for each OSI layer and placed into a data structure internal to Snort for further
processing [33]. The parsing will extract information from the packet such as a TCP session
(transport) over IP (network) on an Ethernet (data link) network, in addition the payload
data will be extracted from the packet. This internal data structure is used to compare
against the Snort rules created by the operator. This paper will not compare against the
internal data structure, but against Snort rules. This section provides an overview of the
Snort system for completeness.
5.3 Anatomy of a Snort Rule
The format of a Snort rule is quite simple, yet it is descriptive enough to build rules that
can match a small flow of packets out of a large stream of packets. The rule has essentially
two parts, a rule header and a rule option [31]; a sample rule can be seen in Figure 5.1.
Although the rule has two major parts, both portions contain many sub-options this paper
will only consider a subset of options that directly relate to Socket functions and static
strings.
5.3.1 Rule Header
The header of a Snort rule describes where the network packet is coming from, where
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alert tcp any any -> 10.0.0.1/24 /
(content: "HTTP/1.x 404 Not Found"; msg:"HTTP error";)
Figure 5.1: Sample Snort rule.
the network packet is heading, and the transport protocol [31]. The first option of the
header section is the rule action which directs Snort what is to be done with a match, this
paper is not concerned about the various options for this field as it is outside of the scope.
For this paper all automated signatures created have the same rule action, hard coded with
the “alert” option from a configurable global setting.
The second option of the header section is protocol, this option informs Snort the type
of network protocol used by the network packet. For the generated signatures, this option
is based on data that is discovered from reverse engineering and information derived from
the socket() function arguments.
The third option is IP address, this option is used twice: once for incoming connections
and once for outgoing connections. The incoming and outgoing IP addresses are separated
by a directional operator which will be discussed later. The IP address sections allows
for different formats: the label “any” can be used as a wildcard, a single IP address, IP
address ranges in CIDR block format [31], or a variable can be used to define a common
network IP range. See Figure 5.2 for an example of a variable for the IP address option.
The IP address value is difficult to derive from static reverse engineering, in many cases
DNS addresses are used by botnets to allow C & C servers to be moved or the DNS
names dynamically generated which complicates detection. In cases where IP addresses
are hard coded the data is often hashed or in binary format and part of the ip addr data
structure which can be difficult or impossible to statically reverse engineer. For this paper’s
experiment $HOME NET and $EXTERNAL NET will be used for the signatures created,
this will allow the operator to globally define IP address ranges in a Snort rules file.
The forth option is the TCP/IP port used by the binary, like IP addresses this option
is used twice: once for incoming connections and once for outgoing connections. The format
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var CORP_NET 10.0.1.0/24
Figure 5.2: Sample IP Address Variable.
of the port option is a wildcard label of ”any,” a single hardcoded port number, or a range
of port numbers in the format of a the starting port number in a contiguous range separated
by a colon to the ending port number. Figure 5.3 is an example of a range of ports defined
in a Snort rule.
22:53
Figure 5.3: Sample Port Variable.
The fifth and final option of the header section is the directional operator, this operator
signifies the flow of the network traffic for the rule. The directional operator has two
typographical formats, see Figure 5.4. Note there is not a left arrow for this reason the IP
addresses and ports will need to be moved to either side of the right arrow for behavior of
a left arrow. The double angle bracket signifies bi-directional traffic [31]. The directional
operator is be derived based on the send() or bind() calls and the associated socket handle.
-> <>
Figure 5.4: Directional Operators.
5.3.2 Rule Options
The rule options of a Snort rule is not strictly structured, but ordering can improve
performance [33]. Because this paper uses a subset of options, ordering for performance is
not considered. The options of concern for this paper are msg, flow, content, and pcre.
The msg option is used to give a brief description of the the rule, for this paper’s experiment
the name of the executable file being examined is used as the value for msg. The flow option
allows Snort to filter out rules that are not traveling in the direction of concerned flow. For
example if the flow option is set as to server Snort will only examine packets that are
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flowing from the client to the server, this value is set according to the use of the Socket
function calls send() or bind() in the source code. The content and pcre are the core of
the options section, this is data that is populated from strings recovered during the reverse
engineering process. The content option is, in many cases, the exact string recovered. The
exception is a format string, the format variable placeholders removed prior to inclusion.
The pcre option is only used on format strings, the format variable placeholders are replaced
with PCRE classes for the appropriate data type. See Figure 5.5 as an example.
String format - %d, %d : USERID : UNIX : %s
PCRE format - \d+, \d+ : USERID :UNIX : \w+
Figure 5.5: Example of a format string converted to a PCRE.
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CHAPTER 6
BUILDING SIGNATURES
This chapter details the design and architecture used to build network signatures from
binaries using static analysis. The process will use the data found in binaries, discussed in
Chapter 4 to build signatures based on Snort rule format discussed in Chapter 5.
6.1 Developing Network Signatures with Static Analysis
Section 6.2 will outline the general design for building the network signatures while
section 6.3 will detail the implementation of generating signatures. Finally section 6.4 will
discuss the method to match the generated signatures with existing Snort rules.
6.2 Design
The design of effective signature generation requires it to be specific enough to identify
and extract the necessary data from the binaries, yet at the same time flexible enough to ac-
commodate the different language nuances, compiler optimizations, and developer induced
code paths. With these requirements in mind the commonality of the targeted malware bi-
naries is the BSD Sockets library, therefore the design is based upon discovering the Socket
function call paths and the flow of data between the Socket functions. The current imple-
mentation is specific to Windows binaries, although to extend to other platforms would be
relatively simple as most modern operating systems use BSD Sockets as their network stack
or at least the basis of their network stack. The design of signature generation relies more
on the general features of BSD Sockets and less on the Windows specific implementation of
BSD Sockets. For the process of building signatures the data to be discovered in a binary
is TCP/IP protocol information, IP addresses, TCP/IP ports, payload data, and finally
any static strings in a binary. This data can be found as arguments to the various socket
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function calls, therefore the implementation of this paper will be to discover call paths from
the send(), connect(), and bind() socket library functions to the socket() function; col-
lecting as much data as possible from the function arguments and combining the discovered
data together to build signatures. The Socket functions are associated to one another by a
socket handle, an integer, which is returned by a call to socket() and then passed as an
argument to the other Socket functions. The binaries targeted for this paper have multiple
socket() calls as they may act as both a client and a server, make connections to C & C
servers, search for infected peers on a local network, or execute local and network based
exploits. If there are multiple calls to socket() the Socket function calls will need to be
associated with the proper socket handle in order to build accurate signatures. Due to the
fact it is not possible to statically read socket handles as they are created at runtime and
the experiment for this paper only considers static analysis. Socket handles will need to be
simulated by mapping call paths from a Socket function to the associated socket() call
that created the socket handle.
6.3 Implementation
6.3.1 Enumeration of Socket Functions
To map call paths between the Socket functions they first need to be enumerated,
beginning with the socket() function call locations along with the containing functions.
Figure 6.1 is an example of a socket() call and the containing function irc connect()
The data from the enumeration will be placed in a custom Python class, discussed in
the next section, which has data structures and utility functions to ease building a call tree.
This same process is performed for bind(), send(), connect(), and other Socket functions
for future use.
6.3.2 NetworkFunction Python Class
NetworkFunction (code listed in Appendix B) is a Python class created for this pa-
per that is used for the enumeration of Socket functions, this class utilizes IDAPython to
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DWORD WINAPI irc_connect(LPVOID param)
{
SOCKET sock;
SOCKADDR_IN ssin;
IN_ADDR iaddr;
LPHOSTENT hostent;
int err, rval;
char nick[16];
char *nick1;
char str[64];
BYTE spy;
DWORD id;
ircs irc;
...
sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
Figure 6.1: Example of a socket() function call from SDBOT5A.CPP
discover Socket function locations and cross references of the functions. The class accepts,
at instantiation, the name of the socket function as the argument which is then passed to
the IDAPython’s LocByName() to recover a linear address of the function in the binary.
See Figure 6.2 for an example of the linear address returned by LocByName(). With the
linear address of the socket function the returned location can be passed to IDAPython’s
XrefsTo() which will return linear address cross references of the passed function as seen
in Figure 6.3.
Python>hex(LocByName("socket"))
4076aa
Figure 6.2: Results for LocByName() with socket as the argument
In this example the function socket is passed to the LocByName() and the cross ref-
erences of socket are returned and stored in loc. The loc variable is then passed to
XrefsTo() and the result is enumerated to gather all cross references. This process is then
23
repeated for each of the Socket functions.
Python>loc = LocByName("socket")
for x in XrefsTo(loc):
print hex(x.frm)
401835
40196b
40675e
406f0d
407004
Figure 6.3: Results for XrefsTo() with the linear address of socket as the argument
6.3.3 Socket Function Arguments
Following the identification and location of the Socket calls, the next step is to locate
the arguments of the Socket functions and extract the argument data if possible. In some
cases the data is not accessible from static analysis because the data is created or collected
at runtime, in those cases the data will either be disregarded, because it is not germane to
the signature, or the data will be populated with a generic placeholder when appropriate.
An example would be the connect() function’s name argument which is a sockaddr data
structure. One of the fields of sockaddr is an IP address, extracting that IP address
can be very difficult as it could be generated at runtime, is obfuscated, or encrypted.
Using the wildcard $HOME NET or $EXTERNAL NET (Section 5.3.1) in place of the
sin addr feild of sockaddr not only resolves the issue of the inability to directly discover
the value, but more importantly provide a value that is common with many known SNORT
rules. The arguments for a function in assembly are pushed onto the stack prior to the
assembly instruction call. The arguments are pushed in reverse order; when parsing, this
is to be taken into account for the argument algorithm. Figure 6.4 is an example of the
socket(af, type, protocol) function [27] listed in IDA Pro, the arguments for socket()
were discussed in detail in section 4.2.1. The example in Figure 6.4 will use the getArgs()
function from backtrace.py [34] as a utility function to parse the Socket function arguments
(code listed in Appendix C).
24
.text:00401965 push 6 ; protocol
.text:00401967 push 1 ; type
.text:00401969 push 2 ; af
.text:0040196B call socket
Figure 6.4: IDA Pro Disassembly of a socket() Function Call
6.3.4 Enumeration of bind and send Functions
The same methods used to locate and enumerate the socket() function is also used
for the bind() and send() functions.
6.3.5 Bind Function Arguments
The use of bind() in a Socket-based application allows the application to accept in-
coming network connections and provide server functionality. Malware binaries often use
bind() to connect to other zombies or for executing software exploits, every malware bi-
nary examined in the experiment for this paper made at least one bind() call. The bind()
function is defined as bind(socket, localaddr, addrlen) [27]. The socket argument
has been discussed previous and is the same as in the send() function. The localaddr
argument is a sockaddr structure, which contains an IP address and port number. The
addrlen argument is the length of the localaddr argument. The port number field of the
sockaddr structure is of most interest and the process of extracting the port number will
be described in this section. The extraction process is similar to that used for sprintf(),
after identifying the location of the bind() call walk back in the assembly until a call to
htons() is reached. The htons() function converts an integer from host byte order to net-
work byte order [27]. Continue walking back from the htons() call until an assembly push
instruction is made, the argument of the push call is the port number of sockaddr. Figure
6.5 is an example of a bind() call from IDA Pro. The port number value is found on line
.text:00401983 it is the argument passed to the htons() call on line .text:0040199C. If
the push value is in hexadecimal format it is converted to decimal, for instance 71h hex-
adecimal would be converted to 113 decimal. Otherwise if the port number value is not
available, if for example it is created at runtime, the port number value of the generated
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signature is set to any.
.text:00401983 push 71h ; hostshort
.text:00401985 mov dword ptr [esp+58h+name.sa family], eax
.text:00401989 mov [esp+58h+name.sa family], 2
.text:00401990 mov dword ptr [esp+58h+name.sa data+2], eax
.text:00401994 mov dword ptr [esp+58h+name.sa data+6], eax
.text:00401998 mov dword ptr [esp+58h+name.sa data+0Ah], eax
.text:0040199C call htons ; Call Procedure
.text:004019A1 lea ecx, [esp+54h+name]
.text:004019A5 push 10h ; namelen
.text:004019A7 push ecx ; name
.text:004019A8 push esi ; s
.text:004019A9 mov word ptr [esp+60h+name.sa data], ax
.text:004019AE call bind ; Call Procedure
Figure 6.5: IDA Pro Disassembly of a bind() Function Call from SDBOT5A.EXE
6.3.6 Send Function Arguments
The send() function is defined as send(socket, buffer, length, flags) [27]. The
only argument of concern is the buffer argument, it is passed to the send() function as a
reference, because of the limitations of static analysis the pointer reference cannot simply be
dereferenced, dereferencing will have to be simulated to access the buffer data. See Figure
6.6 for an example of send() function call in assembly. The lea assembly instruction in this
example loads the address of the send() buffer argument, buf, on to the stack. Discovering
the buffer argument’s variable name the sprintf() call that populates the buf can then
be located by walking back in the assembly.
.text:00401B3F push 0 ; flags
.text:00401B41 push ecx ; len
.text:00401B42 lea ecx, [esp+0D08h+buf]
.text:00401B46 push ecx ; buf
.text:00401B47 push esi ; s
.text:00401B48 call send
Figure 6.6: IDA Pro Disassembly of a send() Function Call
The buffer pointer is usually created with a call to sprintf(), this function allows
for the programmer to format a string by placing run-time variables into a static format
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string. There is access to portions of the format argument of sprintf(), this string can be
used for building the signature. See Figure 6.7 for an example of the sprintf() C function.
char str[100];
char* pass_value = "my_password_value";
sprintf(str, "PASS %s\r\n", pass_value);
Figure 6.7: Example of a sprintf() function call.
The format argument of sprintf() is critical in building signatures for comparison to
Snort rules as many of the Snort rules are based upon packet payloads which contain text
strings. In Figure 6.7 the format string argument, "PASS %s\r \n", is combined with the
arguments that proceed to create a new string stored in the first sprintf() argument in this
example it would be str. Through static analysis the format string argument is available,
but the latter arguments are typically accessible at runtime. The format string argument
generally provides enough information to build an adequate signature for the thesis of this
paper. The format string variable is used to populate the content value of the generated
signature. In addition because the sprintf() format argument contains variables, the
format string argument maps well to regular expressions which allows for the creation of a
pcre value for the generated signatures. The pcre option provides more accuracy for Snort
rules, but the pcre option does have a drawback of significant performance degradation [29].
Because of the performance issue the pcre option will only be generated if a string contains
the sprintf() formatting variables and static text. To simulate dereferencing of the send()
buffer argument, begin by walking back the assembly from the send() linear address until a
sprintf() call is reached and is within the containing function of send() and sprintf().
Figure 6.8 is the disassembly of the sub 401AF0 function in SDbot5A.exe. This function is
a containing function of sprintf() and send().
If the sprintf() function can be located then the arguments are parsed, using the
same methods as described previously for socket() [34], focusing on the format argument
of sprintf(). When the name of the format argument is discovered it can then be walked
back in the assembly to locate the assembly language push instruction for the format
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.text:00401AF0 ; int cdecl sub 401AF0(SOCKET s, int, int, char *Source,
int, int, int, char)
...
.text:00401B29 call sprintf ; Call Procedure
...
.text:00401B48 call send ; Call Procedure
Figure 6.8: IDA Pro Disassembly of the function sub 401AF0 from SDBOT5A.EXE
argument and the value being pushed. This value is typically an offset of the statically
defined format string. See Figure 6.9 for an example of the sprintf() call in assembly.
The offset value is the data used to build the content and pcre values of the generated
signatures.
6.3.7 Build Call Path from send() to socket()
The call path, for reasons discussed earlier, is reconstructed using IDA Pro’s cross
reference information for send() and socket(). The NetworkFunction class gathers cross
reference information for each of the functions and with NetworkFunction’s helper functions
cross references are matched. The process works as follows, after locating the send()
function IDA Pro’s GetFunctionName() and LocByName() [35] is utilized to identify a
function containing send(), which will be noted as function α. This function α is then
compared against socket()’s cross references, if the linear address of α is found in the
cross references the link is made between send() and socket(); if a match is not found
then the containing function of α, which will be noted as function β is then compared
against socket()’s cross references. This continues recursively until containing functions
are exhausted. It should be noted that matching containing functions might not be foolproof
as it relies on socket() appearing only once in a function. In practice the malware examined
made a socket() call only once per containing function, which allows for this method of
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simulating socket handles to work consistently.
.text:00401B23 push offset aPassS ; "PASS %s\r\n"
.text:00401B28 push eax ; Dest
.text:00401B29 call sprintf
Figure 6.9: IDA Pro Disassembly of a sprintf() Function Call
6.4 Building General Signatures Based on the String Data as a Catch-all
Matching sprintf() format strings to a send() call is not always possible, due to the
method the malware was developed. For instance in SDBot05A.exe the format string arug-
ment is passed into the containing function of send() and then passed to send(). Although
this is traceable when manually reverse engineering the malware, automation proved to be
somewhat difficult with the available tools and scripting environment. The work around for
this limitation is to list all the strings found in a binary and attach to the content option and
where applicable the pcre option of a generated signature. The generated signature header
options would be set as a general header: alert tcp $HOME NET -> any $EXTERNAL NET
any, because socket() and therefore the socket handle are unknown. This does have the
potential to cause false positives due to common words and terms. The mediation used in
this paper is to create an excluded strings list, see Appendix E for a sample list. This list
contains strings commonly found in binaries created by compilers or behaviors of a pro-
gramming language, and are not directly created by the binary’s programmer. These words
are excluded from consideration for the content and pcre options in generated signatures.
The implementation of this mediation greatly reduced the false positive rate and as a side
effect decreased the time required to run the experiment.
6.5 Matching Signatures
This paper used many of the popular and publicly available Snort rules for signature
matching (list of rules used are found in Appendix F), it was not limited to solely Snort
rules for bots but included all available Snort rules. Based on my research many of the
bots contain source code for other exploits and network attacks, while the additional Snort
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rules might not be specific to a bot, it does allow for more data to properly fingerprint a
binary. The matching of generated signatures to Snort rules is based on a weighted score
of matching the various parts of a generated signature to a known Snort rule. The header
section has the least amount of weight, values could be tcp or $HOME NET which are very
general and would have a high rate of matching. The header receives more weight if the
Snort rules are matched to specific IP addresses, hostnames or port numbers. The header
information receives 0.5 point if the values are general and a full 1.0 point if matches are
made on specific IP addresses, hostnames, or port numbers. The heavier weight in scoring
is placed on the content option of the Snort rule. The content score is based on letter
and word matches and the percentage of the string that is matched. Matching letters
prevents common single words from scoring as a match against the target string that could
be substantially longer. The threshold is set to 75% match on both letters and words in
order to notify the operator that there is a match. The algorithm used to find word matches
for this paper is the same algorithm used by Snort, Boyer-Moore [32]. This allows for a
partial simulation of real world network traffic and a Snort IDS.
6.6 Results
The implementation of this thesis was tested on a selection of malware bots, the bots
were compiled from source code and the binaries were not packed or obfuscated. The two
reasons for this choice is first with access to the source code the results found from im-
plementation can be confirmed, second as noted in Chapter 2 because binary obfuscation
is not considered in this paper, compiling the bots it can be assured that the binaries
are not packed or obfuscated. The results were positive for identifying bots in an au-
tomated process when comparing to known Snort rules. The bots analyzed for training
were Agobot3, Agobot-phat-glow, and SDBot-5A. For control the Google Chrome browser
version 29.0.1547.76 and the Firefox browser version 24.0, these applications also use the
WinSock API, were analyzed with the implementation of this thesis.
The summarized findings can be found in Table 6.1, the numbers represent the Snort
rules which were returned as matching the examined binary. For instance Agobot3 found 14
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Binary Name Generated Signature Matches to Known Snort Rules
IRC AGOBOT SDBOT GTBOT SPYBOT HTTP FTP MAIL MISC.
akbot 11 0 1 0 0 278 11 5 13
aspergillus 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 4 2
BioZombie 1.5 Beta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 15Pub-pre4 6 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2
C 15Pub.exe 8 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 1
cftmon-dopebot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
cftmon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ChodeBase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CYBER-v4.0 10 0 2 1 0 0 14 7 2
CYBER 10 0 2 1 0 0 12 7 2
CYBERBOTv2.2-Stable
.m0dd ownz.DreamWoRK 13 0 2 1 0 0 13 7 2
darkanal 11 0 0 1 0 0 14 7 3
DCI Bot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GellBot3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
GigaBot-DCASS 13 0 4 1 0 292 15 7 5
H-Bot M0d 3-0 M0dd3d
by TH and Sculay 9 0 0 1 0 286 15 7 5
LiquidBot FixEd By Pr1muZ anD Ic3 13 0 4 1 0 287 14 7 5
NESbot v5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
NEW bot by MSIT WIN 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
rBot-blowSXT 9 0 4 1 0 286 15 7 5
rBot-ciscobawt 9 0 4 1 0 286 15 7 5
rBot-Crackbot v1.4b 9 0 4 1 0 286 15 7 5
realmbot.exe 13 0 1 0 0 288 15 5 5
Reptilex 13 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 3
rxBot-drx-woopie 13 0 4 1 0 289 15 7 5
spybot 11 0 1 2 2 288 1 0 4
Spybot1.2c-full 12 0 1 2 2 294 0 0 4
Firefox 24.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chrome 29.0.1547.76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.1: Generated Signature Matches to Known Snort Rules
matching signatures for IRC and 18 for AGOBOT, the indication is this binary is a Agobot
bot or a derivative of Agobot. It should be noted that many bots analyzed also showed a
high rate of other HTTP, FTP, or mail exploits. This finding is consistent with the fact
that many bots contain application and protocol exploits that are executed by botmaster
from the C & C servers [36]. Therefore the identification of a binary should consider the
high rate of exploits in addition to IRC command & control traits. Spybot is an excellent
example of the need to examine the overall results, about 95% of the found signatures are
HTTP exploits and only about 3% are Spybot, SDBot, and GTBot IRC C & C traits. When
looking at overall functionality and purpose of bots [36] the relatively small percentage of
bot findings when compared to the percentage of exploit findings is consistent with the
behavior and purpose of the bots in a botnet.
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CHAPTER 7
FUTURE WORK AND DIRECTIONS
This paper focused on static analysis of binaries, although there was positive success
in identifying malicious software it is certainly not fool-proof. To increase the ability to
more accurately identify malicious software, dynamic analysis could be employed and the
results of both dynamic and static analysis could be combined and compared to increase
the confidence of the findings. The open source project Cuckoo Sandbox [37] is based on
Python and could be extended to combine the results found in the implementation of this
thesis.
Another interesting direction would be to add visualization to the implementation in
this thesis. The visualization could be updated dynamically and allow the user to see the
genealogy and relationship of bots to other malicious software. Many of the bots examined
used the same exploits for HTTP and FTP, closer examination of these relationships could
provide more information on more efficient processes to detect the malware.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
It is estimated that today the average worker has 2.8 connected devices, with projec-
tions to this to reach 3.3 by 2014 [38]. Because of the proliferation of devices and accessibility
of computer networks the threat of malware has become an increasing concern for businesses
and computer users. The objective of this paper is to provide a proactive means to identify
malware before it appears on computer networks, thereby allowing for earlier detection and
identification. The approach of this paper is to recreate, as much as possible, the network
behavior of a malware sample for the purpose of identifying the software as malicious.
The results from the implementation of this paper indicate that malware network be-
havior can be identified offline through automated static analysis. The malware samples
tested against the implementation were identified not only by the IRC traffic, but also by
matching of known network exploits. Although not as precise as a network capture with
manual examination, the results proved enough information is present from automated
static analysis to identify malicious software.
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Appendix A
SinemaThesis.py
Please see Appendix B and C for information about third party functions used in this
script.
#!/usr/bin/env python
###########################################################
# I am using backtrace.py for some utility functionality ,
# the script can be found at:
# http://tinyurl.com/m72hr2n
#
# I originally located it from the blog entry of the author,
# Alexander Hanel at:
# http://tinyurl.com/kalyo9f
#
#########################################################
import os
import sys
from string import ∗
from NetworkFunction import ∗
from SnortRuleParser import ∗
from backtrace import ∗
# Defined Strings
snort rule action = ”alert”
flowbit name = lower(rstrip(GetInputFile(), ’ .exe’))
extern net = ”$EXTERNAL NET”
home net = ”$HOME NET”
one dir = ”−>”
any dir = ”<>”
any port = ”any”
pcre string = ”\w+”
pcre digit = ”\d+”
pcre hex = ”[0−9A−Fa−f]+”
int replace = ’%d’
str replace = ’%s’
hex replace = ’%x’
# Other structs
regs = [”eax”, ”ebx”, ”ecx”, ”edx”, ”esi”, ”ebp”]
tcpip afam = { 2: ’AF INET’ }
tcpip types = { 1: ’SOCK STREAM’, 2: ’SOCK DGRAM’, 3: ’SOCK RAW’, 4: ’SOCK RDM’, 5: ’SOCK SEQPACKET’ }
tcpip protocol = {}
socket calls = {}
ports = {}
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signatures = []
matching sigs = {}
# IDAPython enumarated Functions, Structs, and Strings from the .exe
exe funcs = Functions()
exe excluded strs = []
exe structs = Structs()
exe strs = Strings()
socket funcs = NetworkFunction(”socket”)
bind funcs = NetworkFunction(”bind”)
connect funcs = NetworkFunction(”connect”)
listen funcs = NetworkFunction(”listen”)
accept funcs = NetworkFunction(”accept”)
send funcs = NetworkFunction(”send”)
recv funcs = NetworkFunction(”recv”)
snortRuleFileParser = CSnortRuleParser(’/Users/dsinema/Dropbox/Scripts/snort rules’)
def printStats() :
#
#
# def printStats())
#
# returns:
#
# description : Print out the SNORT rules that were found to match
# the examined binary.
#
#
for m in sorted(matching sigs):
print ”%d\t%s” % (matching sigs[m], m)
def addToMatchingSigs(sig):
#
#
# def addToMatchingSigs(sig)
#
# returns:
#
# description : Add the passed SNORT rule to the matching sigs[]
# structure .
#
#
if sig in matching sigs:
matching sigs[sig . strip () ] = matching sigs[sig] + 1
else :
matching sigs[sig . strip () ] = 1
def buildTCPIPProtocolDict():
#
#
# def buildTCPIPProtocolsDict()
#
# returns:
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#
# description : Read the protocols file from the host
# filesystem and add contents to the
# tcp protocol{} dictionary
#
#
protocols = open(’/etc/protocols’, ’ r ’ )
for line in protocols :
if line . startswith( ’#’):
pass
else :
tmp = line.split ()
tcpip protocol [ int(tmp[1])] = tmp[2]
def buildExcludedStrs():
#
#
# def buildExcludedStrs()
#
# returns:
#
# description : Read in the exclude text file and import
# entries into a Python list −> exe excluded strs[]
#
#
f = file (”/Users/dsinema/Dropbox/Scripts/ExcludedStrings.txt”, ”r”)
for e func in exe funcs:
exe excluded strs .append(GetFunctionName(e func))
for e str in exe strs :
if ”. dll” in str( e str ) :
exe excluded strs .append(strip(str( e str )))
elif ”.DLL” in str(e str) :
exe excluded strs .append(strip(str( e str )))
if str( e str ) [0] == ’?’:
exe excluded strs .append(strip(str( e str )))
for f line in f :
exe excluded strs .append(strip( f line ))
def buildSocketCalls() :
#
#
# def buildSocketCalls()
#
# returns:
#
# description : This builds the socket func struct [] Python list
# object. This list is used to keep track of the
# socket calls in the examined binary.
#
#
if not socket calls :
socket func struct = []
for crefs in socket funcs .getcodexrefs() :
socket func struct .append(GetFuncOffset(crefs))
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socket func struct .append(findSocketArgs(crefs))
socket calls [GetFunctionName(crefs)] = socket func struct
socket func struct = []
def BoyerMooreHorspool(pattern, text):
#
# http://tinyurl.com/mabdzdd
#
# bmh.py
#
# An implementation of Boyer−Moore−Horspool string searching.
#
# This code is Public Domain.
#
m = len(pattern)
n = len(text)
if m > n: return −1
skip = []
for k in range(256): skip.append(m)
for k in range(m − 1): skip[ord(pattern[k]) ] = m − k − 1
skip = tuple(skip)
k = m − 1
while k < n:
j = m − 1; i = k
while j >= 0 and text[i] == pattern[j]:
j −= 1; i −= 1
if j == −1: return i + 1
k += skip[ord(text[k])]
return −1
def findSocketHandle(func):
#
#
# def findSocketHandle(func)
#
# returns: func frm/func tmp − ea value
#
# description : Find a socket() call related to this
# function. This function is recursive
# and will walk back until it is unable
# to find cross references for containing
# functions.
#
#
func tmp = ””
count = 0
hit main = 0
func name = GetFunctionName(func)
if socket funcs .matchfuncxrefs(func name):
return func name
else :
for x in XrefsTo(func):
count = count + 1
if XrefTypeName(x.type) == ’Data Offset’ and SegName(x.frm) != ’.text’: # exclude refs to
the non−text segments
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pass
else :
func tmp = GetFunctionName(x.frm)
if func tmp == func name:
break
if socket funcs .matchfuncxrefs(func tmp):
return func tmp
else :
func frm = findSocketHandle(LocByName(func tmp))
if socket funcs .matchfuncxrefs(func frm):
return func frm
def findRegValue(address, reg):
#
#
# def findRegValue(address, reg)
#
# returns: val − string value
#
# description : From the address passed in look for the
# value of the register passed in. This looks
# specifically for the assembly instructions
# mov, xor, pop as these are typically used
# to populate the registers .
#
#
regFound = 0
currentAddr = PrevHead(address, minea=0)
while regFound == 0:
if ’mov’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr) or ’lea’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
opt = GetOpnd(currentAddr,0)
if str(opt) == str(reg):
val = str(GetOpnd(currentAddr,1))
if val .endswith(’h’):
val = int(val [:−1], 16)
return val
elif ’xor’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
opt = GetOpnd(currentAddr,0)
if str(opt) == str(reg):
return ”0”
elif ’pop’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
opt = GetOpnd(currentAddr,0)
if str(opt) == str(reg):
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
val = str(GetOpnd(currentAddr,0))
return val
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
def funcArgs(address, num):
#
#
# def funcArgs(address, num)
#
# returns: addr − ea value
# value − String value (NOTE: every value is cast to a string)
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#
# description : Locate and return the args for the function located
# at the passed address
#
#
s = Backtrace()
addr, value = s.getArgs(address, num)
if value in regs :
if value.endswith(’h’):
value = str(int(value [:−1], 16))
else :
value = findRegValue(addr, value)
elif value.endswith(’h’):
value = str(int(value [:−1], 16))
return addr, str(value)
def findSocketArgs(address):
#
#
# def findSocketArgs(address)
#
# returns: arg1, arg2, arg3 − strings
#
# description : Find the arguments for the socket()
# function call . This function also maps
# the numerical values for the arguments to
# the protocol names and family names.
# Example: 6 −> TCP
#
#
addr, arg1 = funcArgs(address, 1)
addr, arg2 = funcArgs(address, 2)
addr, arg3 = funcArgs(address, 3)
if arg1. isdigit () :
if int(arg1) in tcpip afam:
arg1 = tcpip afam[int(arg1)]
else :
pass
if arg2. isdigit () :
if int(arg2) in tcpip types:
arg2 = tcpip types[int(arg2)]
else :
if arg3. isdigit () :
if int(arg3) in tcpip protocol :
if int(arg3) == 6:
arg2 = tcpip types[1]
elif int(arg3) == 17:
arg2 = tcpip types[2]
if arg3. isdigit () :
if int(arg3) in tcpip protocol :
arg3 = tcpip protocol[ int(arg3)]
else :
pass
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return arg1, arg2, arg3
def sprintfArgValues(address, count):
#
#
# def sprintfArgValues(address, count)
#
# returns: tmp − string
#
# description : Find the arguments values for the sprintf ()
# function call .
#
#
tmp = []
x = count
currentAddr = PrevHead(address, minea=0)
while (x > 0):
if ’push’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
opt = GetOpnd(currentAddr,0)
if ’ offset ’ in opt:
off tmp = opt. lstrip ( ’ offset ’) . strip ()
off val = GetDisasm(LocByName(off tmp))
if ’db’ in off val :
off val = off val . lstrip ( ’db’). strip ()
if off val .endswith(’h’):
off val = str(int( off val [:−1], 16))
tmp.append(off val)
x = x − 1
else :
if opt.endswith(’h’):
opt = str(int(opt[:−1], 16))
tmp.append(opt)
x = x − 1
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
return tmp
def pcreSprintfFormat(format struct):
#
#
# def pcreSprintfFormat(format struct)
#
# returns: retval − string
#
# description : Replace the printf format variables
# in the string with PCRE compatible
# variables .
#
#
carriage return = ’\\r’
new line = ’\\n’
retval = ””
for key in format struct.keys():
tmp list = format struct[key]
count = len(tmp list)
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key = key.replace(carriage return , ””).replace(new line, ””) # strip off any returns and new lines
if key == ’%s’:
retval = None
else :
retval = retval + ”/”
for i , c in enumerate(key):
if c == ’%’:
var = str(tmp list .pop())
if key[i+1] == ’d’:
if var in regs :
retval = retval + pcre digit
else :
retval = retval + var
elif key[i+1] == ’s’:
if var in regs :
retval = retval + pcre string
else :
retval = retval + var
elif key[i+1] == ’x’:
if var in regs :
retval = retval + pcre hex
else :
retval = retval + var
elif key[i−1] == ’%’:
pass
else :
retval = retval + c
if retval :
if retval .count(”:”):
retval = retval. replace(”:”, ””)
retval = retval + ”/”
return retval
def sprintfFormatArg(address):
#
#
# def sprintfFormatArg(address)
#
# returns: retval − string
#
# description : Remove all the printf format
# varaibles .
#
#
sprintf dict = {}
retval = ””
addr, value = funcArgs(address, 2)
if ’ offset ’ in value:
tmp str = GetDisasm(addr)
tmp dict = tmp str.split( ’ ; ’ )
value = tmp dict[1]
value = value.strip ()
value = value.strip( ’ ”. ’ )
sprintf dict [value] = sprintfArgValues(addr, value.count(’%’))
retval = pcreSprintfFormat(sprintf dict)
46
return retval
else :
return None
def findSendData(address):
#
#
# def findSendData(address)
#
# returns: formatArg − string
#
# description : Walks back from the send() function
# call to find a sprintf () call . Looks for
# first the assembly instruction call and
# then for sprintf . This function will not
# walk past the containing function.
#
#
func boundry = LocByName(GetFunctionName(address))
regFound = 0
currentAddr = PrevHead(address, minea=0)
while regFound == 0:
if currentAddr == func boundry:
return ””
else :
if ’ call ’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
opt = GetOpnd(currentAddr,0)
if ’ sprintf ’ in opt:
formatArg = sprintfFormatArg(currentAddr)
return formatArg
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
def commentFromPRCE(string):
#
#
# def commentFromPRCE(string)
#
# returns: string − string
#
# description : Utility function that strips
# the PCRE string of the PCRE
# variables .
#
#
if string .count(”:”):
string = string.replace(”:”, ””)
if string .count(pcre string) :
string = string.replace(pcre string , ””)
if string .count(pcre digit) :
string = string.replace( pcre digit , ””)
if string .count(pcre hex):
string = string.replace(pcre hex, ””)
return string
def findPortFromBind(address):
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#
#
# def findPortFromBind(address)
#
# returns: tmp − string
#
# description : Walks back from the bind() function
# call to locate the port argument. This
# works similar to the findSendData function
# above.
#
#
htons found = 0
push found = 0
currentAddr = PrevHead(address, minea=0)
while htons found == 0:
if ’ call ’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
htons found = 1
while push found == 0:
if ’push’ in GetDisasm(currentAddr):
value = str(GetOpnd(currentAddr,0))
if value.endswith(’h’):
value = str(int(value [:−1], 16))
return value
elif value in regs :
tmp = findRegValue(currentAddr, value)
if tmp.endswith(’h’):
tmp = str(int(tmp[:−1], 16))
return tmp
else :
return ”any”
else :
return ”any”
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
currentAddr = PrevHead(currentAddr, minea=0)
def buildPortInformation():
#
#
# def buildPortInformation()
#
# returns:
#
# description : maps a port to a bind() function call
#
#
for brefs in bind funcs.getcodexrefs() :
port = findPortFromBind(brefs)
ports[GetFunctionName(brefs)] = port
def buildSnortSignatures():
#
#
# def buildSnortSignatures()
#
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# returns:
#
# description : The meat of the script this is the
# function that creates the signatures .
#
#
#
snort rule = ””
buildPortInformation()
for screfs in send funcs.getcodexrefs() :
pcre tmp = findSendData(screfs)
if pcre tmp:
if bind funcs.matchfunc(screfs):
if bind funcs.getfunc( screfs ) in socket calls :
if bind funcs.getfunc( screfs ) in ports:
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + lower(socket calls[bind funcs.getfunc( screfs
) ][1][2]) + ” ” + home net + ” ” + ports[bind funcs.getfunc(screfs)] + ” ”
+ one dir + ” ”+ extern net + ” ” + any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’flowbits : set , score6 ’
+ flowbit name + ’; ’
if ’tcp’ in snort rule :
snort rule = snort rule +’flow:from server, established ; ’
elif ’udp’ in snort rule :
snort rule = snort rule +’flow:from server, stateless ; ’
if pcre tmp:
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + commentFromPRCE(pcre tmp) + ’
”; ’
snort rule = snort rule + ’pcre:”’ + pcre tmp + ’”;’
else :
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + lower(socket calls[bind funcs.getfunc( screfs
) ][1][2]) + ” ” + home net + ” ” + any port + ” ” + one dir + ” ”+
extern net + ” ” + any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’flowbits : set , score5 ’
+ flowbit name + ’; ’
if pcre tmp:
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + commentFromPRCE(pcre tmp) + ’
”; ’
snort rule = snort rule + ’pcre:”’ + pcre tmp + ’”;’
snort rule = snort rule + ’)’
signatures .append(snort rule)
else :
if findSocketHandle(screfs) in socket calls :
if findSocketHandle(screfs) in ports:
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + lower(socket calls[findSocketHandle(screfs)
][1][2]) + ” ” + home net + ” ” + ports[findSocketHandle(screfs)] + ” ” +
one dir + ” ”+ extern net + ” ” + any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’flowbits : set , score4 ’
+ flowbit name + ’; ’
if ’tcp’ in snort rule :
snort rule = snort rule +’flow:from server, established ; ’
elif ’udp’ in snort rule :
snort rule = snort rule +’flow:from server, stateless ; ’
if pcre tmp:
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + commentFromPRCE(pcre tmp) + ’
”; ’
49
snort rule = snort rule + ’pcre:”’ + pcre tmp + ’”;’
else :
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + lower(socket calls[findSocketHandle(screfs)
][1][2]) + ” ” + home net + ” ” + any port + ” ” + one dir + ” ”+
extern net + ” ” + any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’flowbits : set , score3 ’
+ flowbit name + ’; ’
if pcre tmp:
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + commentFromPRCE(pcre tmp) + ’
”; ’
snort rule = snort rule + ’pcre:”’ + pcre tmp + ’”;’
snort rule = snort rule + ’ )’
signatures .append(snort rule)
def formatStringValue(string):
#
#
# def buildSnortSignatures()
#
# returns:
#
# description : The meat of the script this is the
# function that creates the signatures .
#
#
#
carriage return = ’\r’
new line = ’\n’
retval = ””
tmp str = ””
tmp str = string.replace( ’\r’ , ””).replace( ’\n’, ””)
if tmp str.count(’%’):
tmp list = tmp str.split ()
for i in range(0,len(tmp list)) :
retval = retval + tmp list[ i ]. replace( int replace , ””).replace( str replace , ””)
if i < (len(tmp list) − 1):
retval = retval + ” ”
else :
retval = tmp str
return retval
def pcreFromComment(string):
carriage return = ’\r’
new line = ’\n’
retval = ””
tmp str = ””
tmp str = string.replace( ’\r’ , ””).replace( ’\n’, ””)
if tmp str.count(’%’):
retval = retval + ”/”
tmp list = tmp str.split ()
for i in range(0,len(tmp list)) :
retval = retval + tmp list[ i ]. replace( int replace , pcre digit ) . replace( str replace , pcre string) . replace(
hex replace, pcre hex).replace(”:”, ””)
if i < (len(tmp list) − 1):
retval = retval + ” ”
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retval = retval + ”/”
else :
retval = ””
return retval
def stringSnortRules():
snort rule = ””
for s in exe strs :
if formatStringValue(str(s). strip ()) not in exe excluded strs :
for strrefs in XrefsTo(s.ea):
if SegName(strrefs.frm) == ’.text’:
if findSocketHandle(strrefs .frm) in socket calls :
if len(formatStringValue(str(s))) > 0:
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + lower(socket calls[
findSocketHandle(strrefs .frm) ][1][2]) + ” ” + home net + ”
” + any port + ” ” + one dir + ” ”+ extern net + ” ” +
any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’
flowbits : set , score2 ’ + flowbit name + ’; ’
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + formatStringValue(str(s))
+ ’”;’
if len(pcreFromComment(str(s))) > 0:
snort rule = snort rule + ’ pcre:”’ + pcreFromComment(
str(s)) + ’”;’
else :
if len(formatStringValue(str(s))) > 0:
snort rule = snort rule action + ” ” + ”tcp” + ” ” + home net +
” ” + any port + ” ” + one dir + ” ”+ extern net + ” ” +
any port + ” (”
snort rule = snort rule + ’msg:”’ + GetInputFile() + ’”; ’ + ’
flowbits : set , score1 ’ + flowbit name + ’; ’
snort rule = snort rule + ’content:”’ + formatStringValue(str(s))
+ ’”;’
if len(pcreFromComment(str(s))) > 0:
snort rule = snort rule + ’ pcre:”’ + pcreFromComment(
str(s)) + ’”;’
if len( snort rule ) > 0:
snort rule = snort rule + ” )”
if len( snort rule ) > 0:
signatures .append(snort rule)
snort rule = ””
def findSignatureMatches(sigs, rules lib ) :
for sig in sigs . rules :
sig word total = len(sig .contents. split ())
sig letter total = len(sig .contents)
for rule in rules lib . rules :
rule word total = len(rule.contents. split ())
rule letter total = len(rule.contents)
count = 0
if len(rule .contents) > 0:
if sig .contents in string .punctuation:
pass # This deals with
strings are punctuation (.,:;)
else :
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s = BoyerMooreHorspool(sig.contents, rule.contents)
if s > −1:
if rule .hdr proto == sig.hdr proto:
count = count + 1
for port rule in rule .hdr ports:
for sig port in sig .hdr ports:
if sig port == port rule:
#print ”Port: ” + sig port
if sig port != ’any’:
count = count + 1
else :
count = count + 0.5
if (( sig word total/rule word total) ∗ 100) > 75:
if (( sig letter total / rule letter total ) ∗ 100) > 75:
addToMatchingSigs(rule.msg)
else :
pass
def buildSnortRule():
buildTCPIPProtocolDict()
buildSocketCalls()
buildExcludedStrs()
buildSnortSignatures()
stringSnortRules()
signatureRuleParser = CSnortRuleParser(signatures)
findSignatureMatches(signatureRuleParser, snortRuleFileParser)
printStats()
buildSnortRule()
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Appendix B
NetworkFunction.py
#!/usr/bin/env python
from idaapi import ∗
from idc import ∗
from idautils import ∗
class NetworkFunction:
def init ( self , name=None):
self .name = name
self .address = None
self .codexrefs = []
self . funcxrefs = []
self .funcxrefsaddr = []
self .setaddress()
self . setfuncxrefs ()
self .setfuncxrefsaddr()
self .setcodexrefsTo()
#####################################################################
# Name: setaddress()
# input variables : Nothing
#
# Returns: Nothing
#
# Description: This function sets the address of
# the function name.
#####################################################################
def setaddress( self ) :
if self .name:
self .address = LocByName(self.name)
else :
self .address = None
#####################################################################
# Name: setxrefs ()
# input variables : Nothing
#
# Returns: Nothing
#
# Description: This function sets the self . xrefs list
# to xrefs for the NetworkFunction. This function
# calls the XrefsTo() IDAPython function call
# to walk the xrefs .
#####################################################################
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def setfuncxrefs ( self ) :
for xref in XrefsTo(self .address, 0):
funcName = GetFunctionName(xref.frm)
if self . funcxrefs .count(funcName) < 1:
self . funcxrefs .append(funcName)
#self. funcxrefs . sort()
def setfuncxrefsaddr( self ) :
#print hex(self .address)
for xref in XrefsTo(self .address, 0):
#print hex(xref.frm)
func = get func(xref.frm)
if func:
#print hex(func.startEA)
if self .funcxrefsaddr.count(func.startEA) < 1:
#print ”func: %s” % hex(func)
self .funcxrefsaddr.append(func.startEA)
#self. funcxrefs . sort()
def setcodexrefsTo( self ) :
for xref in CodeRefsTo(self.address, 1):
#print xref
#print hex(xref)
if xref :
self .codexrefs.append(xref)
#self.codexrefs. sort()
#####################################################################
# Name: getname()
# input variables : Nothing
#
# Returns: name of NetworkFunction object
#
# Description: This function returns the name of
# NetworkFunction
#####################################################################
def getname(self):
if self .name:
return self .name
else :
return None
#####################################################################
# Name: getaddress()
# input variables : Nothing
#
# Returns: address of NetworkFunction object
#
# Description: This function returns the address of the
# NetworkFunction
#####################################################################
def getaddress( self ) :
if self .address:
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return self .address
else :
return None
#####################################################################
# Name: getxrefs ()
# input variables : Nothing
#
# Returns: list of xrefs for function
#
# Description: This function returns a list of address
# of xrefs to NetworkFunction
#####################################################################
def getcodexrefs( self ) :
return self .codexrefs
def getfuncxrefs( self , num=None):
if num:
return self . funcxrefs [num]
else :
return self . funcxrefs
def getfuncxrefsaddr( self , num=None):
if num:
return self .funcxrefsaddr[num]
else :
return self .funcxrefsaddr
def getfunc( self , addr=None):
if addr:
for s in self .codexrefs:
#print ”s: %s” % hex(s)
if GetFunctionName(s) == GetFunctionName(addr):
return GetFunctionName(s)
else :
return None
else :
return None
#####################################################################
# Name: addxrefs()
# input variables : address
#
# Returns: Boolean
#
# Description: This function adds to self . xrefs ,
# this allows future proofing. The function
# returns True if the address was added
# successfully , and False if not.
#####################################################################
def addxrefs( self , address=None):
if address:
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func name = GetFunctionName(address)
self . xrefs .append(address) # add item to list
self . xrefs . sort() # sort the list after ...
if self . funcxrefs .count(func name) < 1:
self . funcxrefs .append(func name)
self . funcxrefs . sort()
# error out in future ∗∗ TODO ∗∗
def addstring( self , string=None):
if string :
self . nearstrings .append(string)
#####################################################################
# Name: matchxrefs()
# input variables : address
#
# Returns: Boolean
#
# Description: This function searches the self . xrefs to
# find a match for the given address.
# Returns True if found otherwise False.
#####################################################################
def matchxref(self , address=None):
if address: # if address is valid , search
for xref in self . xrefs :
#print xref
if str(address) == str(xref):
return True
return False # Looped through list and address was not found
else :
return False
#####################################################################
# Name: matchname()
# input variables : name
#
# Returns: Boolean
#
# Description: This function is a utility function to
# match the name of the NetworkFunction
# object with the given name.
#####################################################################
def matchname(self, name=None):
if name == self.name:
return True
else :
return False
#####################################################################
# Name: matchaddress()
# input variables : address
#
# Returns: Boolean
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#
# Description: This function is a utility function to match
# the address of the NetworkFunction object
# with the given address.
#####################################################################
def matchaddress(self, address=None):
if str(address) == str(self .address):
return True
else :
return False
def matchfuncxrefs(self , func name=None):
if func name:
if func name in self . funcxrefs :
return True
return False
else :
return False
def matchfunc(self, addr=None):
if addr:
for s in self .codexrefs:
#print ”s: %s” % hex(s)
if GetFunctionName(s) == GetFunctionName(addr):
return True
else :
return False
else :
return False
57
Appendix C
Backtrace.py
Backtrace.py was used for some utility functionality, the entire script can be found at
https://bitbucket.org/Alexander_Hanel/backtrace. This appendix will only include
the function getArgs() that was used from backtrace.py.
def getArgs(self , address, count):
’get specified (by count) argument and address’
pushcount = 0
instructionMax = 10 + count
currAddress = PrevHead(address,minea=0)
while pushcount <= count and instructionMax != 0:
if ’push’ in GetDisasm(currAddress):
pushcount += 1
if pushcount == count:
return currAddress, GetOpnd(currAddress,0)
instructionMax −= 1
currAddress = PrevHead(currAddress,minea=0)
return None, None
58
Appendix D
Boyer-Moore-Horspool Function
A public domain implementation of the Boyer-Moore-Horspool algorithm found at
http://code.activestate.com/recipes/117223-boyer-moore-horspool-string-searching/
was used for the Boyer-Moore algorithm. The function is listed below for completeness.
def BoyerMooreHorspool(pattern, text):
# An implementation of Boyer−Moore−Horspool string searching.
#
# This code is Public Domain.
#
m = len(pattern)
n = len(text)
if m > n: return −1
skip = []
for k in range(256): skip.append(m)
for k in range(m − 1): skip[ord(pattern[k]) ] = m − k − 1
skip = tuple(skip)
k = m − 1
while k < n:
j = m − 1; i = k
while j >= 0 and text[i] == pattern[j]:
j −= 1; i −= 1
if j == −1: return i + 1
k += skip[ord(text[k])]
return −1
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Appendix E
Excluded Strings List
This string list is used to cut down the false positives when searching for strings in a
binary to use for the Snort rule content option. Most of the strings are compiler generated
or used for language specifics used internally by the binary and runtime environment and
are typically not exposed on a network.
kernel32
GetProcAddress
LoadLibraryA
ExitThread
msvcrt
system
IsProcessorFeaturePresent
KERNEL32
runtime error
RegisterServiceProcess
Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
Runtime Error!\n\nProgram:
Runtime Error!Program:
<program name unknown>
GetLastActivePopup
GetActiveWindow
MessageBoxA
InternetGetConnectedStateEx
IcmpSendEcho
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IcmpCloseHandle
IcmpCreateFile
0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
0123456789+- .*#hlL^ztjqZw’&@I
Process32Next
Process32First
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
RegisterServiceProcess
runtime error
abnormal program termination
main thread
ActivateKeyboardLayout
AdjustWindowRect
AdjustWindowRectEx
AlignRects
AllowForegroundActivation
AllowSetForegroundWindow
AnimateWindow
AnyPopup
AppendMenuA
AppendMenuW
ArrangeIconicWindows
AttachThreadInput
...
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Appendix F
Snort Rules Used for the Experiment
The Snort rules used in this experiment can be found:
F.1 Snort Community rules:
http://www.snort.org/snort-rules/
app-detect.rules
attack-responses.rules
backdoor.rules
bad-traffic.rules
blacklist.rules
botnet-cnc.rules
browser-chrome.rules
browser-firefox.rules
browser-ie.rules
browser-other.rules
browser-plugins.rules
browser-webkit.rules
chat.rules
content-replace.rules
ddos.rules
deleted.rules
dns.rules
dos.rules
experimental.rules
exploit-kit.rules
exploit.rules
file-executable.rules
file-flash.rules
file-identify.rules
file-image.rules
file-java.rules
file-multimedia.rules
file-office.rules
file-other.rules
file-pdf.rules
finger.rules
ftp.rules
icmp-info.rules
icmp.rules
imap.rules
indicator-compromise.rules
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indicator-obfuscation.rules
indicator-scan.rules
indicator-shellcode.rules
info.rules
local.rules
malware-backdoor.rules
malware-cnc.rules
malware-other.rules
malware-tools.rules
misc.rules
multimedia.rules
mysql.rules
netbios.rules
nntp.rules
oracle.rules
os-linux.rules
os-mobile.rules
os-other.rules
os-solaris.rules
os-windows.rules
other-ids.rules
p2p.rules
phishing-spam.rules
policy-multimedia.rules
policy-other.rules
policy-social.rules
policy-spam.rules
policy.rules
pop2.rules
pop3.rules
protocol-dns.rules
protocol-finger.rules
protocol-ftp.rules
protocol-icmp.rules
protocol-imap.rules
protocol-nntp.rules
protocol-pop.rules
protocol-rpc.rules
protocol-scada.rules
protocol-services.rules
protocol-snmp.rules
protocol-telnet.rules
protocol-tftp.rules
protocol-voip.rules
pua-adware.rules
pua-other.rules
pua-p2p.rules
pua-toolbars.rules
rpc.rules
rservices.rules
scada.rules
scan.rules
server-apache.rules
server-iis.rules
server-mail.rules
server-mssql.rules
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server-mysql.rules
server-oracle.rules
server-other.rules
server-samba.rules
server-webapp.rules
shellcode.rules
smtp.rules
snmp.rules
specific-threats.rules
spyware-put.rules
sql.rules
telnet.rules
tftp.rules
virus.rules
voip.rules
web-activex.rules
web-attacks.rules
web-cgi.rules
web-client.rules
web-coldfusion.rules
web-frontpage.rules
web-iis.rules
web-misc.rules
web-php.rules
x11.rules
F.2 Bleeding Snort rules:
http://www.bleedingsnort.com/downloads/bleeding.rules.tar.gz
bleeding-attack_response.rules
bleeding-dos.rules
bleeding-drop-BLOCK.rules
bleeding-drop.rules
bleeding-dshield-BLOCK.rules
bleeding-dshield.rules
bleeding-exploit.rules
bleeding-game.rules
bleeding-inappropriate.rules
bleeding-malware.rules
bleeding-p2p.rules
bleeding-policy.rules
bleeding-scan.rules
bleeding-virus.rules
bleeding-web.rules
bleeding.rules
F.3 Emerging Threats Snort rules:
http://www.emergingthreats.net/open-source/etopen-ruleset/
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emerging-deleted.rules
emerging-dns.rules
emerging-dos.rules
emerging-drop.rules
emerging-dshield.rules
emerging-exploit.rules
emerging-ftp.rules
emerging-games.rules
emerging-icmp.rules
emerging-icmp_info.rules
emerging-imap.rules
emerging-inappropriate.rules
emerging-malware.rules
emerging-misc.rules
emerging-mobile_malware.rules
emerging-netbios.rules
emerging-p2p.rules
emerging-policy.rules
emerging-pop3.rules
emerging-rbn-malvertisers.rules
emerging-rbn.rules
emerging-rpc.rules
emerging-scada.rules
emerging-scan.rules
emerging-shellcode.rules
emerging-smtp.rules
emerging-snmp.rules
emerging-sql.rules
emerging-telnet.rules
emerging-tftp.rules
emerging-tor.rules
emerging-trojan.rules
emerging-user_agents.rules
emerging-virus.rules
emerging-voip.rules
emerging-web_client.rules
emerging-web_server.rules
emerging-web_specific_apps.rules
emerging-worm.rules
F.4 Vorant IRC Bot Snort rules:
http://www.vorant.com/files/irc-bot-snort-rules.txt}
irc-bot-snort-rules.rules
